Rewriting a Forgotten War

Now forgotten in Saddam hysteria, in late 1993, the U.S. was at war with a small country on the Indian coast of the African continent: Somalia.

Even then, we didn't hear much about the fighting. In fact, many people thought at the time that America's altruism had led us to embark on a humanitarian mission in that impoverished, war-torn nation. This was simply a facade.

Several months after the initial invasion, the U.S. decided that it would be "humanitarian" to "remove" some of the clan leaders running the Somali capital of Mogadishu, a large city on the coast. Although the mission was technically a success, over 500 Somalis and 18 Americans unexpectedly died in the process.

This daytime raid in to the dense urban environment of Mogadishu was recently recounted in a month-long series (1/11--2/9) published in the Seattle Times, entitled, "Black Hawk Down: An American War Story." The author, Philadelphia Inquirer reporter Mark Bowden (the Inquirer and Times are co-owned), gave readers a month-long military pulp novel describing every drop of blood spilled in a military mission gone bad. We were treated to information like, "the muscles of his leg hung open in oozing flaps" (part 15), and, "It struck Yurek [an American Ranger] how similar killing a man was to shooting targets in practice" (part 18).

The lead paragraph to each part of the series states: "the mission should have been simple." The premise is that military invasions and infringements on the sovereignty of other nations are fine in principle; but, if not performed correctly, they're a disgrace.

The space the Times dedicated to this series was remarkable--29 parts in all--especially considering the lack of space and solid reportage dedicated to Iraq issues escalating at the same time. The Times' coverage of the Clinton Administration's Iraq claims was generally uncritical; even an editorial opposing military strikes virtually begged Clinton to make a better case for invasion. In "Black Hawk Down," the editorial attitude towards invasions into other lands was horrendous.

Only parts 3 and 20 of the series gave substantial insight into the Somali perspective of the invasion, despite the claim that "dozens of Somalis" involved were interviewed. In part 15, it's implied that Somalis "don't care about their own lives." In part 17, it's implied that they are "villains," and in part 26, Bowden calls their actions "savage"--an interesting choice of words for an African country.

Meanwhile, virtually no explanation was given as to why the war was happening in the first place. Parts 2--27 were entirely dedicated to a war narrative. Only parts 1, 28, and 29 of the series spent any time discussing American policy in the region or the politics of the invasion. Even this discussion was limited in scope.

The invasion came during a prolonged U.S. presence in the region, initiated in February 1993. U.S. troops arrived amidst much media coverage, under the guise of a supposedly humanitarian mission called "Operation Restore Hope." Before banks of cameras, the Marines landed on the beach at 2 AM local time, so that it could be broadcast live on the evening news on the east coast of the U.S. Later, Colin Powell called the operation a "paid political advertisement" for the Pentagon. The operation was more a symbolic show for the world's TV cameras than any serious effort to get a stream of food moving. Relief agencies, virtually all of which (including the International Red Cross) opposed the invasion, had reported that the famine had peaked months earlier and was subsiding. At the time, the Manchester (U.K) Guardian reported that the world media spent 10 times as much money covering the invasion as was being spent on food itself.

What were the conditions leading to the famine and civil strife that the U.S. was supposedly trying to prevent? Unexamined in "Black Hawk Down," they include food politics, the willingness of the U.S. to sell military hardware to all sides of a conflict, and decades of U.S. and Russian support for Somalian dictator Siad Barre, who intentionally destroyed the country's infrastructure to keep it out of the hands of his rivals.

Barre received only one mention in the entire series, in part 28: "Aidid's army [the clan the U.S. was trying to oust in the October invasion] had overthrown longtime dictator Siad Barre two years earlier." That's it. No mention of U.S. support for or arms sales to Barre. Ironically, the weapons sold to Barre were eventually used against U.S. troops. This wasn't pointed out.

Bowden and the Times had the chance--and the responsibility--to shed light on the sheer stupidity of U.S. invasions, especially in areas where we helped create the crisis. This was the first, and probably only, retrospective series about Operation Restore Hope. It came precisely when the U.S. was threatening to launch yet another poorly defined military adventure. It did little to restore our hope in the propaganda machine that is the U.S. media.

Media Watch is written every two weeks by members of the Media Watch collective, a local group monitoring Seattle news media. Our next meeting will be Monday, Mar. 16 at 6:00 PM, 3rd floor Univ. Baptist Church (4554 12th Ave. NE in Seattle). For info or to get involved, e-mail mediawatch@u.washington.edu or call 632-1656.