In late May, President Clinton gave a commencement address to the U.S. Naval Academy, in which he gave details about two new national security directives. Directives 62 and 63 call for a "strengthening of the nation's defenses against emerging unconventional threats to the United States: terrorist acts, weapons of mass destruction, assaults on our critical infrastructures and cyber-attacks." Directive 62 establishes an office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism (CNN dubbed the position the "counter-terrorism czar").

According to White House Factsheets and Clinton's speech, these directives seem aimed at the possible threat of biological warfare used by "terrorists" on U.S. citizens, and attacks on American telecommunication infrastructure via computers.

For the first directive, National Guard troops will be trained to aid local police officers in case of terrorist attacks. In addition, a number of actions are to be taken to prevent or recover from a biological attack: enhanced medical surveillance to detect epidemics, additional medical training for doctors and nurses, and a stockpile of vaccines for civilians.

For the second directive, Clinton wants various law enforcement and intelligence agencies to work with "the private sector" (nervous yet?) to find ways to make computer and telecommunications systems more secure. It calls for the creation of a "National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)" at the FBI.

The first directive has several good ideas, but is fueled by intense paranoia. It's true that anyone at any time could possibly have a deadly disease and plan to release it to harm the public. But is it likely? It's far more difficult to disperse a biological agent than Bill Clinton would have you think. If it is so unlikely, should we be prepared for such an attack? It's reminiscent of the "peace through strength" arguments which said that we should have immense nuclear arsenals "just in case." What the directive doesn't tell you is that the unlikely specter of biological warfare has been used for decades to justify the development of the U.S.'s own military stockpile of biological weapons.

The second directive seems almost silly. If you are worried about your sensitive computer information and vital control systems, make them inaccessible via the Internet or phone lines. It's that simple. Then you only have to worry about actual physical contact with the computers, which is your own business.

Most likely this directive was a reaction to the occasional hacker attempting to gain access to government computers. These hackers have not done any damage, apart from defacing several government homepages (which, of course, makes the government look silly until they can fix them). This directive may lead to a "war on hackers," something like the war on drugs.

Perhaps this act is a government giveaway to Big Business. The government will help to fund research on computer security to develop new products, which will then be given away to these businesses. A more secure telecommunications systems (i.e., the Internet) would also help to "realize the full potential of the information superhighway as a commercial marketplace," as is the supposed goal stated by the White House's White Paper on the National Information Infrastructure.

It all appears to be built upon fear. The government overreacts to a terrorist attack, and puts anti-terrorism plans into effect. When no further terrorism is seen, the plan is declared a success. In the meantime, a lot of money is wasted that could have been better spent elsewhere.

Sources: LA Times May 21, 1998; UPI May 18, 1998; White House Fact Sheets May 22, 1998; White House Press Briefing May 22, 1998.