The Yugoslav policy of Russian President Boris Yelstin during NATO airstrikes is twofold. On one hand, it speaks to his impeachment proceedings in the Duma (delayed from April until mid-May), and on the other it relates to Russia's position with international creditors.

Many Russians want their country to provide Yugoslavia with military aid, and Yeltsin panders to the Russians' opposition to the U.S.-led NATO bombing of the Balkans. He, for example, threatened to re-direct nuclear weapons towards European nations participating in the NATO airstrikes, which Washington dismissed out of hand.

The appeal to the historic Slavic bond between Russia and Yugoslavia is the domestic basis for Yeltsin's militaristic stance towards NATO. It helps deflect Russians' eyes away from his role in dismantling the country's economy. Meanwhile, the living standards of the Russian public continue to worsen.

Case in point is the country's under-18 population. In the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Aleksandr Baranov, a respected Russian pediatrician and chairman of the Russian Union of Pediatricians, noted there are "almost no completely healthy children or teenagers" of all socio-economic backgrounds in Russia.

Accordingly, social tensions are rising in Russia, which is also the largest recipient of International Monetary Fund loans. Russian communists and nationalists lead the opposition to Yeltsin and the country's festering socio-economic crisis. Unfortunately, there is no help on the way.

Current IMF loan conditions--as they have for the past eight years--preclude Yeltsin from implementing an FDR-type New Deal to benefit the Russian people. In fact, the IMF is now requesting Russia to restructure its $150 billion in foreign debts by increasing taxes on citizens and other measures that will make Russian life more desperate. This year alone, Russia faces $17 billion of debt repayments, though it has an annual government budget of $20 billion. "It is very clear for both the Russian government and the IMF that Russia is unable to pay this money, and the question is only how this debt is going to be restructured," observed Boris Kagarlitsky, an author and analyst at Moscow's Institute of Comparative Political Studies.

The implications of Russia's internal politics and financial fragility extend to the Balkans. "The war in Yugoslavia allowed Russia to take a much tougher stand in the negotiations and especially with their American diplomacy," Kagarlitsky added. "The Americans are really very upset with this change in Russia's position because this is seen as a sort of potential threat."

To be sure, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is a big player in talks to end the NATO war against Yugoslavia. His recent moves, such as freeing three captured American soldiers, are proof of that. Yet it is Yeltsin who holds the key to peace.

Here is why. Because of Russia's link to Yugoslavia and this connection with Russia's internal politics and large foreign debt, the U.S. needs Yeltsin's help as much as he does their help. However reluctantly, it would seem that U.S.-led NATO may have to allow a Yeltsin-led Russia, internally fragile and unstable, to successfully negotiate a diplomatic agreement that ends the war over Kosovo. Though not President Clinton's cup of tea, he simply cannot risk further Russian instability. Thus, Clinton must compromise with Yeltsin--whom Washington backed in the last presidential election.

Simply put, the advantages for the U.S. to a Russian-brokered peace plan for the Balkans may well outweigh the U.S. need to preserve NATO's "credibility." Currently, Clinton and Yeltsin have a shared interest for Russia and the U.S. to try to ensure Russian stability. In the short term, global financial stability depends in large part on Yeltsin remaining in office. His impeachment could well lead to another Russian debt default. This would make the meltdown of the Long-Term Capital Management "hedge fund" look like a day at the beach.

Under today's capitalist globalism, Russia is perhaps the system's weakest link. The country's frailty reveals the thrust of what economist Robin Hahnel describes as a global credit system without a global central bank. In the meantime, Yeltsin is letting his political underlings take the spotlight until he makes a diplomatic move. To this end, Yeltsin's subordinates are Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov with international creditors, and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomydrin with NATO.

As the IMF irons out the details of a new loan agreement with Russia, a diplomatic push driven by Yeltsin's role in Russia's internal politics and international economics could end the war over Kosovo.

What does all this add up to for Yeltsin? With just over a year left in his presidential term, much is uncertain in his fight for political survival. Now, however, the contours of this fight flow from Yeltsin's uses of Yugoslavia.