Nature and Politics
by Jeffrey St. Clair and Alexander Cockburn
Test Anxiety
In the first few months of the Bush administration international treaties
have been falling faster than old-growth trees in the national forests. Now
comes word that the Bush administration wants to end the moratorium on
testing nuclear weapons and junk the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
In June Bush instructed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
to examine "what it would take to do various kinds of tests on various time
scales." The NNSA, a shadowy wing of the Department of Energy, is the
agency that manages nuclear weapons research, development, and the testing
complex. This examination is part of an ongoing "Nuclear Posture Review"
that is becoming increasingly unnerving to many peace activists.
Bush fumed against the test ban treaty repeatedly during his campaign,
alleging that it undermined US national security. Although the current
moratorium on nuclear testing was put into place as a pre-election ploy by
Bush's father in 1992, Bush suggested during the campaign that a new round
of testing might be needed.
Since the election, Bush, perhaps not wanting a photo op of him with a
mushroom cloud to go along with the one of him turning the tap on
arsenic-laden water, has remained stubbornly mute on his personal position
on resuming nuclear tests. But Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and
Vice-President Dick Cheney have been less coy. Both have argued that the US
needs to resume nuclear testing, alleging that such periodic detonations
are necessary to ensure the reliability of the Pentagon's cache of nuclear
weapons.
This is an old canard. The only parts of the nuclear stockpile that are
likely to deteriorate are the non-nuclear components, which can be, and, in
fact, are, regularly tested and evaluated by the weapons teams without
encroaching on the terms of the test ban treaty. "All non-nuclear parts to
a weapon can be extensively lab tested and replaced as needed--if needed at
all," says Jay Coghlan, director of NukeWatch. "The nuclear parts,
specifically plutonium, and surrounding high explosives have been found to
actually achieve greater stability with age."
The purported rationale for the US nuclear stockpile, which now totals some
12,000 nukes and 10,000 plutonium pits (or triggers), is deterrence.
Coghlan suggests that the real interest of the testing faction isn't to
assure reliability, but to shift the US nuclear strategy from deterrence to
more tactical uses. "US nuclear weapons are certainly reliable in the sense
that they are sure to go off," says Coghlan. "The concern that the military
has with reliability is that weapons are not only guaranteed to go off, but
explode close to design yield. This is important not for mere deterrence,
but for nuclear warfighting, counterforce, and possible first strike
capabilities. These weapons are over-designed in terms of yield to begin
with for mere deterrence."
One of the great myths of the Clinton era was that Clinton supported total
abolition of nuclear testing. In fact, Clinton authorized a series of
so-called sub-critical nuclear tests, and a number of other nuclear
programs, that quietly flouted the test ban treaty--the very treaty he
simultaneously heckled the Senate for failing to approve.
The Bush administration, of course, has no intention of asking the Senate
to approve the test ban treaty, where it has languished for more than two
years, since it was rejected 51-48 in a partisan vote. But its top arms
control negotiator, John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security, has also determined that the administration
can't unilaterally withdraw the treaty from consideration. The Senate has
two options: it can approve the treaty by a two-thirds vote or it can send
it back to the president for renegotiation through a simple resolution,
which only requires a majority vote.
Currently, 161 nations have signed onto the treaty and 77 nations have
ratified it, including all the US's partners in NATO. For the treaty to go
into force, it must be approved by 13 other nations. The holdouts include
China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, and the US. Other leaders at
the G-8 summit chided the Bushies on their repudiation of the test ban
treaty. But their status as a renegade doesn't seem to have deterred them
in the least.
Indeed, in May, the Bush team bullied its NATO allies into a major retreat
in its communique on the test ban treaty. In December the ministers had
agreed that: "we remain committed to an early entry into force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and, in the meanwhile, urge all
states to refrain from any acts which would defeat its object and purpose."
The May communique was a sadly diluted document only urging "all states to
maintain existing moratoria on nuclear testing."
The exacerbating tensions between the US and the other nuclear nations may
lead to an awkward situation this week when the US is scheduled to host the
Conference on Accelerating Entry into Force of the Test Ban Treaty, slated
for New York City on September 25-27.
Bush has loaded the top levels of his administration with full-blooded
nuclear hawks, including Defense Department flacks Douglas Feith, Richard
Armitage, and Paul Wolfowitz, all of whom have railed against the
limitations of the test ban treaty. The most fanatical of the brood may
well be Jack Crouch II, Bush's pick to become Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy. In the mid-1990s, Crouch wrote a
series of articles attacking the test ban treaty and the testing
moratorium. He also wrote that he believed that the US should deploy
nuclear weapons in South Korea and consider using them against North Korea
if they did not accede to US demands to drop their nuclear and biological
warfare programs.
Shortly after taking office, the Bush crowd heard from an advisory
committee that had just completed a study on the "reliability, safety, and
security" of the US nuclear arsenal. The panel was headed by John Foster,
the former director of Lawrence Livermore Labs and former Director of
Defense Research and Engineering at the Pentagon. Foster now serves as an
adviser to TRW, one of the nation's top defense contractors.
The Foster group urged the administration to begin taking steps to resume
testing as quickly as possible and to begin training a new crop of weapons
designers who could develop "robust, alternative warheads that will provide
a hedge if problems occur in the future." Even though most other nuclear
scientists disagree, Foster, a protege of the mad bomber himself, Edward
Teller, dismissed computer modeling as a substitute for real nuclear
explosions. "There are a number of underground tests that we can't
reproduce," Foster told a gathering of weapons designers at the National
Defense University in June. "We have these enigmas."
For Foster the answer to every enigma seems to be a nuclear explosion. He
is a doomster in almost every respect. He argues that the US nuclear
arsenal is aging and growing ever more unreliable. The average age of the
US nuclear weapons stockpile is 18 years, which Foster claims is six years
older than their intended design life. "They will be many times their
design life before they are replaced," Foster said. "We have opened some of
the warheads and found some defects that are worrisome." (Though certainly
not so worrisome as a prospect of them ever being used.)
Using the Foster report as an excuse, in June the Bush administration
instructed the Department of Energy to study how to shorten the time it
takes to prepare nuclear tests at the Nevada test site, the 1,350 square
mile bombing range 65 miles northeast of Las Vegas. Currently, the DOE says
it will take 36 months to resume testing. But hard-liners in the Bush
administration, such as Gen. John A. Gordon, Director of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, want this reduced to less than 4 months.
Darwin Morgan the chief spokesman for the Nevada Test Site, said that his
staff is ready to conduct a range of explosions, from a big blast meant for
intimidation to the testing of components and the evaluation of new
warheads. "The question is what information do you want back from the
test," Morgan said. "If it were to rattle a sword, we could do that fairly
quickly."
As the Pentagon moves ever closer towards resumption of testing, Secretary
of State Colin Powell continues to chide India and Pakistan about dire
consequences if either nation conducts new nuclear tests. "The Nuclear
Security Agency's site readiness effort will unfortunately send exactly the
wrong message to the would-be testers and test ban treaty hold-out states,
including India, Pakistan, and China," says Daryl Kimball of the Arms
Control Institute. "It leaves the door open to a global chain reaction of
nuclear testing, instability, and confrontation in the future."
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