(From the CIA Factbook)

Population: 26.8 million (as of July 2001)

Natural Resources: natural gas, petroleum (oil), coal, copper, chromite, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious stones

Geography: 12% arable land, 46% pasture land, 3% forests and woodlands, 39% bare rock, mountain, desert, and other unproductive land.

Life expectancy: 46.97 years for men and 45.47 years for women

Ethnic groups: Pashtun 38%, Tajik 25%, Hazara 19%, Uzbek 6%, and minor groups (Aimaks, Turkmen, Baloch and others) 12%.

Religions: Sunni Muslim 84%, Shi'a 15%, other 1%

Literacy: 47.2% of men and 15% of women

Per capita income: $800

Labor force: 70% agriculture, 15% industry, 15% service

Debt: $5.5 billion (as of 1996)

Exports: opium, fruits and nuts, handmade carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, and gems

Export partners: former Soviet states, Pakistan, Iran, Germany, India, Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Czech Republic

Imports: food, most consumer goods, and capital goods (for example, machinery, electronics, trucks, parts, etc.)

Infrastructure:

21,000 km of roads, but only 2,793 km are paved 1 natural gas pipeline 10 airports with paved runways and 3 helicopter pads 1 active AM radio station (in Kabul) 1 active FM radio station 10 TV stations in various cities (1 in Kabul run by the Taliban) electricity production: 64.29% hydropower and 35.71 fossil fuels 55 military training bases and installations (according to press accounts)--none of them are significant, according to the Bush administration

Bin Laden: Scanty Evidence

Britain's Prime Minister, Tony Blair, released a report last week that leaves "absolutely no doubt that bin Laden and his network are responsible" for the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. But a closer look at the report reveals inconsistencies and untruths that leave a lot of doubt as to who planned the attacks.

Most of the report is devoted to linking bin Laden to the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya in Tanzania in 1998. Testimony in the trial of the men who carried out the embassy bombings implicates two groups: bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

Most of the FBI's and the CIA's understanding of Al Qaeda, its operatives, and their links to other terrorist groups comes from the testimony in this trial. The FBI's star witness, Jamal Al-Fadl, described a pyramid of political, military, business, and charitable organizations with bin Laden seated firmly at the top. Beneath bin Laden is a council called the Shura, which consists of a group of senior members of several different terrorist groups who share resources and run the committees. Notably, none of the defendants on trial described this structure. Al-Fadl himself was a defector from Al Qaeda; he had a falling out with bin Laden in 1998, then stole some of Al Qaeda's funds and fled.

Al-Fadl then meandered around the Middle East, visiting Syria, Saudia Arabia, and Israel. In each country, he tried to get the government to take him seriously and listen to his story, to no avail. But then he approached the US, which jumped at the chance to use him in the embassy bombings trial.

In fact, videotapes seized in raids on suspected terrorists in Europe have shown bin Laden and others issuing fatwas against the US in unison, in support of each other. This points to a network of terrorist groups in which the senior members are equals, not a corporate-style pyramidal structure with bin Laden at the top.

It is difficult to believe that the senior members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a group that is twice as old as Al Qaeda and has accomplished the assassination of Anwar Sadat, bombings of Egyptian government buildings, and devastating attacks on tourist sites, would defer to bin Laden.

The Blair report says: "Al-Qaida operatives ... have described how the group spends years preparing for an attack. They conduct repeated surveillance, patiently gather materials, and identify and vet operatives, who have the skills to participate in the attack and the willingness to die for their cause." The report states that this is a unique characteristic of Al Qaeda, which is untrue. The same words can be used to describe Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Army of Aden (which claimed credit for the USS Cole bombing), Hezbollah (which blew up the US embassy in Lebanon in 1983 and bombed the US army barracks in Beirut), the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (responsible for bombings in Algeria and France), and dozens of other terrorist groups.

The other evidence falls apart upon examination. Here's a quick rundown:

--Intercepted phone messages. Suspected Al Qaeda members discussed an attack against US targets "on or around Sept. 11" before the WTC attack happened. No support is given for this assertion. There's no explanation why these messages are now being said to have occurred before the attack and not afterwards, as originally reported.

Bin Laden called his mother on Sept. 10 saying that he wouldn't be able to meet her in Damascus because something big was planned. This could have been anything, including the suicide bombing that killed the main opposition leader in Afghanistan the day before the WTC attack.

--Three of the hijackers have links to bin Laden. British and US intelligence disagree on this. The US says Wali Mohamed al-Shehri and Hamza Al-Ghamdi were trained by bin Laden, even though the evidence, which is vague at best, places them at only one of the estimated 55 (or more) training camps and schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The camp where the two men supposedly trained is run by a different Islamic group that trains guerrillas to fight in Kashmir.

The Blair report doesn't name the three hijackers, but British officials say the three men are Mohamed Atta, Majed Moqed, and Khalid Almihdhar. The report also says that Almihdhar is the Al Qaeda link to the Cole and embassy bombings, but US officials dispute that. Almihdhar once met someone in Malaysia who may have been linked to the Cole attack, but he didn't play a part in either the Cole or embassy bombings.

--One of bin Laden's closest and most senior associates planned the WTC attack. Again, the Blair report doesn't name this person. US intelligence officials don't know who the report is referring to. They are puzzled by it and think Tony Blair misread efforts to investigate bin Laden's associates as an assertion that at least one of them planned the attack.

Other evidence cited in the media is equally flimsy:

--Suspicious short-selling of European airline and insurance stocks. The CIA claims that bin Laden and Al Qaeda deal mostly in cash, so how could they sell stock they don't own? The three companies whose stocks were "targeted" had just issued financial information about lower-than-expected profit levels, which is why their stock traded at a higher volume on Sept. 10.

--The French and Spanish links. Two groups of Islamic extremists recently arrested in France and Spain are closely linked to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and not to Al Qaeda.

On the other hand, Djamel Beghal, recently arrested in the United Arab Emirates, has confessed that he was part of an "Al Qaeda" plot to bomb the US embassy in Paris and other US targets in France. Beghal doesn't name bin Laden specifically; instead, he was recruited by Abu Zubaydah, a Palestinian with links to Hamas. Abu Zubaydah is one of several men living in exile in Afghanistan who's often described as the "brains behind bin Laden." (This implies that the term "mastermind" is an inaccurate description of Osama bin Laden.)

--The German link. Several of the hijackers lived and studied at universities in Hamburg, Germany. The German secret police believe they may have had contact with a Syrian businessman named Mamoun Darkazanli, who at one time managed some of bin Laden's financial assets, but they have no proof other than "joint membership in Islamic clubs." German police detained and questioned Darkazanli, but let him go for lack of evidence.

--And, finally, the money transfers. Mustafa Mohamed Ahmad, a man suspected of being an Al Qaeda financial operative, transferred money to one of the hijackers before the attacks. Three of the hijackers transferred $15,000 back to Ahmad's account in the UAE. Then a man--no name is given--took the cash and bought an airline ticket to Karachi, Pakistan, where his trail disappeared. No evidence is given regarding Ahmad's links to bin Laden or Al Qaeda. Notably, Pakistan, with its cash-based, black market economy, is a perfect place to launder money. It's also the main route for money to travel to reach Afghan charities or the Taliban for its war effort.

It's possible that US intelligence agencies have more classified material that the press and Tony Blair haven't seen, but that's unlikely. When the US recently made its case for bin Laden's guilt to NATO, European diplomats were quoted as saying that the evidence contained "no smoking gun," was "circumstantial at best," and that much of it was already in the public domain.

Some of the many sources for this article: "Allied Detail Case Against Bin Laden," Los Angeles Times, 10/5/01; "Text of Evidence Against bin Laden," AP, 10/4/01; "Witness Revealed bin Laden's World," AP, 9/30/01; "Following the money trail," BBC News Online, 9/19/01; "French trials expose bin Laden tentacles," The Times of London, 9/28/01; "Paris suspect denies Bin Laden link," BBC News Online, 10/2/01; "German Officials Link Hijackers To Al Qaeda Group," Washington Post, 9/27/01, A1; "Bin Laden's 'cash link' to hijackers," BBC News Online, 10/1/01; "NATO: U.S. Evidence on Bin Laden 'Compelling,'" Washington Post, 10/3/01, A11; and "Five Egyptian Islamic militants appear on Bush's wanted list," Agence France Presse, 9/25/01.