Focus On The Corporation
by Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman
Don't Defer, Don't Prefer--Prosecute
Let's get one thing straight: a deferred prosecution agreement, also known
as pre-trial diversion, was never intended for serious, repeat wrongdoers
like Arthur Andersen LLP.
The papers are reporting that any day now, maybe even today, the Justice
Department, using such an agreement, will drop its indictment of Arthur
Andersen LLP and put the accounting firm on a type of probation for a
period of time. If what is left of Andersen doesn't get caught engaging in
further wrongdoing during this probationary period, then no charges will be
brought. The firm's criminal slate will be wiped clean.
That's how a deferred prosecution agreement works.
For first time, non-serious offenses, such agreements are a good idea. They
save prosecutorial and judicial resources and help unclog the courts.
For serious, repeat wrongdoers like Andersen, they are a bad idea, because
they undermine justice by entrenching the double standard between the
powerful institutions of society and the less powerful individuals, and by
sending a signal that, no matter how many times the powerful get caught, in
the end, they will be let off the hook.
If you or I, individuals, engage in serious, repeated wrongdoing, we will
lose our freedom (read: prison). But Andersen commits serious, repeated
wrongdoing, and it doesn't lose its freedom, even though the law says it
must.
Under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule of Practice 102(e)(2)
"any person convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude shall be forthwith suspended from appearing or practicing" before
the SEC. The SEC says this means that any accountant convicted of a felony
may no longer certify the financial statements of a public company. So, if
Andersen is convicted of a felony, it loses much of its business. For an
institution, that's the practical equivalent of prison.
Andersen would lose its freedom to operate as it wishes.
Deferred prosecution agreements were never intended for serious offenses
like the destruction of tons of documents and obstruction of justice that
Andersen is accused of. The U.S. Attorney's Manual makes this clear when it
says that a major objective of pretrial diversion is to "save prosecutive
and judicial resources for concentration on major cases."
If the Andersen case is not a major case, then they don't exist.
In yesterday's New York Times, Kurt Eichenwald reported that such
agreements "are unusual in corporate criminal cases, but they are not
unprecedented." He cites as an example a 1994 case where Prudential
Securities was allowed to enter into such an agreement to resolve criminal
charges that it had defrauded investors in the sale of energy limited
partnerships.
But a more relevant example is the case of Arthur Andersen itself, in 1996,
when the United States Attorney in Connecticut agreed to defer prosecution
of a federal criminal investigation of Andersen's endorsement of a
misleading financial prospectus by Colonial Realty Company. Colonial went
bankrupt in 1990. Andersen paid $10.3 million to resolve its potential
criminal liability and was placed on probation for 90 days. Andersen
admitted no wrongdoing. The bankruptcy of Colonial sunk thousands of
investors in Connecticut and around the country.
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, who conducted his own
investigation of Andersen, has said recently that "in Colonial, Andersen
also inexplicably destroyed an unknown number of documents and electronic
files relating to Colonial's real estate ventures." Blumenthal's
investigators found that Andersen certified as reasonable unsupported
financial projections for Colonial's Constitution Plaza syndication and
that Andersen employees had destroyed documents relating to its dealings
with Colonial.
Blumenthal said that it was subsequently determined that Andersen
accountants violated principles of accounting and that the overall
relationship between Colonial and Andersen impaired the objectivity of
Andersen accountants.
Earlier this year, Blumenthal cited other examples of what he called
"Arthur Andersen's shoddy, unethical and illegal work." Recently, the firm
settled a major fraud investigation with the Securities and Exchange
Commission concerning the services it provided to Waste Management, paid
$110 million in damages in the Sunbeam securities fraud case, and is
currently under scrutiny in litigation resulting from its alleged role in
the collapse of Boston Market.
When David Duncan, the Andersen partner in charge of auditing Enron, pled
guilty last week to obstructing justice, he gave federal prosecutors the
upper hand.
So what do the prosecutors do? If we are to believe the papers, they agree
to drop the obstruction charge against Andersen. This is a perverse result.
It is a major victory for Andersen. It makes no sense. It sets another bad
precedent.
Andersen already had at least one free bite of the apple. The firm was
given a deferred prosecution agreement in the Colonial Realty case, and now
it wants a second bite in the Enron case.
If there is time, we make this plea to Michael Chertoff, Leslie Caldwell,
and the other prosecutors in charge of this case: don't defer, don't
prefer--prosecute Andersen and Enron to the full extent of the law.
Russell Mokhiber is editor of the Washington, D.C.-based Corporate Crime
Reporter. Robert Weissman is editor of the Washington, D.C.-based
Multinational Monitor. They are co-authors of Corporate Predators (Monroe,
Maine: Common Courage Press; see http://www.corporatepredators.org). To
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(c) Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman
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