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Colombia: The Next Crisis is Here
by Geov Parrish
Back in February, I wrote about an ominous new development in Colombia's
long-simmering civil war: a new poll that, at the very moment the U.S.
Congress received a Bush Administration request for expanded military aid,
a far right, minor-party extremist named Alvaro Uribe Velez had taken a
surprising and firm lead in polling for that troubled country's
presidential elections. Uribe had displaced the ruling party's candidate,
Horacio Serpa, by promising a sweeping and brutal crackdown on rebels, and
by promising that such a campaign would be backed to the hilt by the
Pentagon. Given that voter turnout is highest among urban and wealthier
Colombians weary of the decades of war, Uribe's tough talk played well.
In subsequent weeks, the Pentagon did, in fact, begin to escalate its
involvement in Colombia's war, with the sort of post-9-11 bipartisan rubber
stamp that has marked most of Congress's responses to America's
ever-widening military commitments. Bush Administration figures also began
to label FARC and other Colombian rebel groups as "terrorists," even making
the ludicrous claim that they posed a terrorist threat on U.S. soil. And,
in an effort to save his party's grip on power, current president Pastrana
dropped his three-year-old effort to negotiate a cease-fire and instead
unleashed a sweeping offensive against guerrillas, including saturation
bombing of what had until that point been designated as a "safe" territory
for the rebels. In response, FARC and other rebel groups began bringing the
largely rural, low-intensity war to Colombia's cities: bombing
infrastructure, kidnapping politicians, and otherwise retaliating for
Pastrana's betrayal.
And two weeks ago, Uribe won anyway -- with 51% of votes counted, a slim
majority that means he will not even need to face a runoff in the crowded
field.
As I noted in February -- but it's worth repeating -- the last time
Colombia elected an extremist like Uribe, in 1950, the resulting
dictatorship killed 150,000 people in three years before a coup deposed it.
On the prior occasion, in 1898, the result was the "Thousand Days' War,"
and another 100,000 massacred. The talk in Bogota these days is of a
50-year cycle of tragedy, and how the United States is not only walking
right into it, but encouraging it.
Uribe's decisive victory, and his predictably bellicose post-election
statements, leave no room for doubt. A dramatic escalation in Colombia's
war is upon us, and in both Bogota and Washington, the expectation is that
the United States will be a full partner. That could mean anything from
acceleration of weapons sales and gifts (already happening), military
advisers on the ground (already happening), covert activity though DynCorp
and other CIA fronts (already happening), and deployment of U.S.-backed and
trained mercenary forces (already happening), to active use of U.S. air
power and even ground troops against military targets.
While Washington's long-standing preference remains to fight its battles
with proxy forces if possible, it has already been involved militarily,
directly and indirectly, for a number of years in the Amazon Basin.
Primarily, this has involved support for local militaries prosecuting the
War on Drugs in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, but in each of these
countries, the portion of the drug trade associated with anti-government
forces has tended to be prioritized, and that associated with
pro-government forces -- or the government or military itself -- ignored.
Particularly in the post-September 11 climate, where U.S. troops are now
deployed in ground patrols in at least a half-dozen different countries,
active U.S. military involvement in Colombia's war is much more likely than
it could have been a year ago. Now, moreover, Bogota has in power a
government that feels none of the usual constraints to keep reliance upon
U.S. power circumspect.
That's not the only constraint Uribe is likely to ignore. Colombia already
has the hemisphere's worst human rights record -- a euphemism that
translates to jailings, torture, assassinations, and other types of
repression that would be grounds for an all-out U.S. invasion were they
practiced in neighboring Venezuela. In Colombia, much of the damage is
carried out by paramilitary groups -- a favorite calling card being
chainsaw dismemberments -- whose terrorism is supported at least by weapons
and training from the Colombian military and police forces. Reports keep
cropping up that some of the same people are also involved -- and that U.S.
personnel are at least at times involved, too. And now, Colombia has
elected as its president a man who first came to national prominence a
decade ago, encouraging the growth of "self-defense groups" -- paramilitary
vigilantes of the sort associated with 80% of Colombia's human rights
abuses.
In the end, distinctions as to where American assistance stops and local
firepower takes over hardly matter. In a continent that has seen three
major, spontaneous, successful mass uprisings in the last year and a half
-- the focus of each of which (Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia) was refusing
to allow local governments to be controlled by international, especially
American, institutions and companies -- the United States has now clearly
cast its lot with the continent's most violent regime in a war it cannot
win. Moreover, virtually nobody in the United States seems to have noticed,
or cared.
For years, observers have been warning that Colombia could explode, with
the United States caught in the explosion. By all accounts, that crisis is
finally here.
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