Afghanistan's Loya Jirga

On June 12 the Loya Jirga convened in Afghanistan to select a new interim government for the country. But the first real exercise in democracy in Afghanistan's history has been fraught with problems.

During the run-up to the assembly, elections were held throughout Afghanistan to select delegates for the Loya Jirga. News trickled into the British press of problems with the process. People complained that they were not informed of when public nomination meetings were held, and some folks who showed up to these meetings were turned away by local warlords' men and told to go home. Many people, particularly in eastern and southern Afghanistan, complained that they were not allowed to vote because they had not participated in jihad. In other areas there were complaints of vote buying. In Western Afghanistan, several popularly elected delegates, who were nevertheless unpopular with local warlords, were murdered. Others were jailed and beaten.

In Kabul, there were complaints that several warlords bribed the Karzai government and its appointed Loya Jirga Commission to get seats in the assembly. And, while a clause in the agreement to set up the assembly states that no one with innocent blood on their hands would be seated in the Loya Jirga, delegates found that the whole front row of the assembly was composed of warlords, many of whom are notorious human rights abusers.

The Loya Jirga was to be composed of 1,500 delegates--1,000 of them democratically elected and 500 appointed by the commission. The appointments were to be reserved for areas of the country too remote for conducting elections and places where fighting was still going on, making elections impossible. Yet on June 11, more than 2,000 delegates showed up in Kabul and demanded to be seated, indicating that many more than 500 delegates had been "appointed." In fact, at the last minute, the commission added an additional 50 seats reserved just for warlords who had not managed to beat, kill, fix an election, or bribe their way into the assembly.

Estimates of the number of delegates participating in the Loya Jirga on the first day varied between 1550 and 1700, with apparently no official count made. This makes the business of determining a clear majority difficult and clouds the outcome of any vote taken by the assembly.

The first order of business, even before the Loya Jirga convened, was for the US to remove all challenges to Hamid Karzai's candidacy for interim president. The former king, Zahir Shah, was forced by US advisors to step down, even though he had the support of 700-800 of the delegates. US advisors also pressured Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former president of Afghanistan, to withdraw his candidacy. That left only Masuda Jalal, a woman candidate and former employee of the UN's World Food Program, which has done most of the work in feeding Afghanistan's starving population since last October. She didn't have a lot of support, but even her few votes were too many for Karzai; a member of his government approached her with a bribe to get her to withdraw. Being a principled person, she refused. Still, with the field clear, Karzai won overwhelmingly.

On the second day, disgusted with the maneuvering behind closed doors, 60-70 delegates walked out of the Loya Jirga, claiming that no voting was going on.

The US is doing its best to suppress democracy in Afghanistan, not foster it. It was important for Karzai, the US appointee and a western-educated man with ties to oil companies and The World Bank, to succeed. The Bush administration hopes that, with a strong central government loyal to US interests in Kabul, US troops will be able to completely pull out of Afghanistan in the near future.

But manipulating the Loya Jirga holds the risk of sparking a renewed civil war in Afghanistan. Karzai is not a strong leader; he has no influence outside of Kabul and he will have to rely on his alliances with bloodthirsty warlords--many of them hated by the people they govern--to hold the country together. His government has proved corrupt, having bribed it opponents and accepted bribes. Karzai has shown favoritism to the Tajiks (who control most of the important positions in his government) at the expense of Uzbeks, Hazars, and his own ethnic minority, the Pashtuns.

And, finally, the lack of democracy in the Loya Jirga itself means that Karzai has not been democratically elected. Without that legitimacy, he will have no moral authority when factions--religious and ethnic--begin to fight each other.

Some sources for this article: "Suspicion and Protest Mark Run-up to Afghan Grand Council," Eurasia Insight, Eurasianet.org, 6/7/02; "Debate on Ex-King's Role Delays Afghan Loya Jirga," Reuters, 6/10/02; "Uncertainty Hovers over Loya Jirga," Eurasia Insight, Eurasianet.org, 6/10/02; "Logistics and politics delay Afghan grand council," Guardian Unlimited, 6/10/02; "Email from Herat," Guardian Unlimited, 6/10/02; "Loya jirga," Guardian Unlimited, 6/10/02; "Dispute over role of king delays loya jirga," The London Independent, 6/11/02; "Afghans protest over US manipulation of summit influence at loya jirga," The London Independent, 6/12/02; "Disillusioned delegates walk out of loya jirga," Guardian Unlimited, 6/12/02; "Dozens Walk Out as Afghan Assembly Prepares to Vote," Reuters, 6/12/02; "Karzai claims post early, Confusion not likely to alter Afghan vote," USA Today online version, 6/12/02.